

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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This grand measure [the Army of Reserve] turns out, at last, to be nothing more than a mere addition to the militia, with all the evils of that system, perverted and misapplied as it has been for several years past. Now, in the whole of the United Kingdom, 138,000 men are to be raised by ballot, with the privilege of exemption from personal service, on the condition of finding a substitute. Does any man dream, that, after this, it is possible for Great-Britain to have an army? The hope is utterly childish. An army not recruited must waste away. In spite of all the hopes, which some may indulge of transferring men, by new bounties, from the ballotted and substitute force to the regular army, the army must unavoidably stand still for the present, and, one may venture to say, that, under such a system, it is not likely to be again put in motion."—
Mr. WINDHAM'S Speech, June 20, 1803. Register, Vol. III. p. 329.

[250]

IRISH EXCHANGE.

SIR.—I felt great pleasure in your having adverted, in your last week's Summary of politics, to the important fact, which came in the course of the debate on the Irish Bank Restriction Bill, on the 21st of February. Mr. Corry, I remember, on that occasion, hinted, with considerable warmth, and, I dare say, with great sincerity, how much better pleased he should have been if Lord Archibald's inquiry had been made to him *in private*, and not in the face of Parliament. Perhaps, had he reflected on the temper of that Parliament, he would rather have preferred the latter mode. This extraordinary confession was passed by in total silence, not a syllable was uttered in reply, and the House of Commons have thus given their sanction to a proceeding, as unjustifiable as ever was practised and avowed. Mr. Corry and his associates may now go on, at least, until a different spirit prevails, both in the government, and in the legislature, to justify themselves in any way they please, and from whatever fund. Should the exchange be, as from these gentlemen being secured from its effects it probably will, to 50 per cent. against the proprietors of estates in Ireland, their salaries will be undiminished. But though Parliament may consider this abuse as beneath its dignity or above its competency to inquire into, or redress, it is fit that the public should understand the enormity of it. How dare the officers of the Irish Treasury, with Mr. Corry at their head, on their own authority, with no usage, no precedent in their favour, thus put their hands into the public purse? Mr. Corry admits that these salaries are taken from a fund existing in England for the service of Ireland. Upon the whole of this, and the Irish government have a right to draw. They, and they only are entitled to the profit arising on the exchange between England and Ireland, for the service of the public in Ireland. In proportion as this

fund is lessened by the deduction of these salaries at par, this profit is diminished, and the Irish government defrauded. They are charged upon, and should be paid in, Ireland, saddled as every other species of Irish income is, with the current rate of exchange. Were this the case, was the community protected, as it ought to be, from the discretionary proceedings of secretaries, commissioners, and clerks, there might be some hope of a remedy being devised to check the present enormous, and, I am convinced, artificial excess of the exchange against Ireland. Mr. Corry and the rest of the gentlemen at par, would then sympathize with the other proprietors of Ireland, many of whom, as well as they, are obliged to attend in Parliament, and, on that ground, have the same right, had they the same means, of receiving their incomes free from the burden of exchange, which Mr. Corry may be assured they are as unwilling to bear as he is. But, till Parliament, or the country, shall stamp this gross misconduct, long clandestinely practised, and now unblushingly avowed, with the reprobation it deserves, the Irish resident in England may rest assured, that the exchange will long remain a thorn in their sides. Mere indifference to an evil which does not reach them would render the Irish ministers backward in redressing it, but I suspect they have an interest in its continuance from their connexion with the Dublin bankers, who are accumulating immense fortunes by the unrestrained and arbitrary issue of paper. This practise, grounded upon the restriction on payment in specie, no reflecting man can doubt is the chief cause of the present high rate of exchange against Ireland. The sums annually remitted thence to absentees, and the interest on the Irish loans payable in England, may aggravate the evil, but it is obvious, that in spite of these, were guineas now, as they were in 1796, the common medium of circulation between both coun-

tries, the rate of exchange, on any given sum against Ireland, could never much exceed the price of the freight and insurance upon that sum in guineas from Ireland hither. Whenever it did, guineas would be sent over in place of bills, until the level was restored.—To return, Sir, to the subject, whence I have briefly digressed. Mr. Corry has no doubt told the truth; but, I suspect, not the *whole* truth. I confess I feel a curiosity to ask, and the public have a right to know, in what mode the officers of the Irish Treasury are paid when in Ireland. Some of these gentlemen reside there pretty constantly, none of them are detained here by parliamentary or official duty the whole year round. In what shape do the former receive their whole salaries, and the latter such portions of it as grow due in that part of the year which they condescend to pass in Ireland? I am informed, and as, after the avowal of Mr. Corry any thing is credible, can readily believe, that, as in England, these Treasury officers pay themselves at par, so, in Ireland, they pay themselves *in guineas*. Their profit in the latter case is still greater than in the former, since guineas in Ireland bear, as you observe, a premium of more than 12 per cent. It may be asked, how are these guineas obtained? I think I can guess. There existed in Ireland, a little time back, a *depôt* of specie, collected and preserved by the government for the payment of the troops in case of invasion or rebellion. Has this fund remained sacred and untouched? If still in existence, has it not been diminished? Have not these Treasury gentlemen found means to dip into it “a whisker first, and then a claw?” If they deny this, they are bound to shew where *they* find guineas, while the rest of the community must be contented with paper. The alternative is still more scandalous, since then the government must actually purchase guineas at 2s. 4d. a piece premium, in order to pay these men, who, in all humility, style themselves the *servants* of the public and the crown. They are, indeed, a privileged race, all other men's incomes bear the burden of taxes. The situation of other men is made to sympathize with that of the country. In this respect we all have neighbour's fare. Not so these placemen. Their salaries, and emoluments are untouched, and amidst the general decay and consumption of every other species of property, “flourish in immortal youth.” I well remember when Mr. Pitt's income tax was laid on, the salaries of the commissioners of Customs and Excise were imme-

diately raised from 1000l. to 1200l. a year, in other words, the public was taxed to pay *their* taxes, and they enjoyed a greater income than before. Now, when a most intolerable tax, in the shape of exchange, is imposed upon the proprietors of Ireland, “pray bear it patiently my good friends,” cries Mr. Corry, “the subject is *delicate*, is *intricate*, requires *candour* and *temper*. Thus does this pampered steed with “unwringing withers” preach to us poor “galled jades.” All the time he is helping himself to his salary at par, secretly, while he could, but now by open confession in the face of Parliament and the public. So, in Ireland, when the public is oppressed by the arbitrary issue and depreciation of private paper, and compelled to transact their business without gold, silver, or copper, the optimist Lords of the Irish Treasury assure them, that all is for the best, and that metallic money, as Robespierre termed it, is all a joke, in the moment that they are filling their pockets with the “useless and expensive encumbrance” of guineas. I should be glad to think with you, Mr. Cobbett, that this practice will undergo a parliamentary inquiry. Hitherto, the House of Commons, in not condemning, have approved of it. If the public are not awakened to it, through the medium of the press, all will go much too smoothly with these Treasury Lords, who are their own paymasters and own accountants. Certain I am, that had the Irish Parliament, which was vilified only that it might be the more easily destroyed, continued still the guardian of the Irish purse, the persons in question would not have dared to pay themselves at par, while the exchange is at 19 per cent. I will not trespass on your time by pursuing this subject any farther, at present; but, unless it is taken up by abler pens than mine, will certainly resume it whenever you have a column to spare. Should the practice I complain of be neither punished nor reformed, the people of Ireland will do better to throw themselves on the mercy of Mr. Corry and his colleagues, and thankfully accept what part of the revenue they may choose to spare, than to place any reliance on the wisdom or virtue, either of the imperial administration or the imperial Parliament; but this, I confidently hope, will not be the case; I hope and trust Parliament will interfere.—I am, Sir, yours, HIBERNICUS.

P. S. One question I had forgotten to ask of Mr. Corry, which, perhaps, as usual, he prefers answering in private. He enjoys a patent office in Ireland, Surveyor of Ho-

TO THE EDITOR.

SIR,—In the last number of your Register you have given the public a detail of the effectual measures hitherto adopted by the British Creditors to recover their property invested in the French funds, under the faith of treaties, and in a just confidence they would be observed; and you have added some remarks altogether injurious to their conduct on that occasion. You do not indeed state, nor can you prove, that in this transaction they have acted either in violation of the laws of their own country, or in contradiction to the rights and usages of foreign nations. In the wide and extensive relations of commercial intercourse now subsisting throughout the civilized world, is it matter of surprise or reproach that many individuals of all countries should be led to deposit a portion of their wealth in the hands of foreign merchants, or in foreign banks and foreign funds? So far from it, the deposit has ever been held sacred, and the character of the proprietor has never, till now, been impeached. Do the English probate the conduct or patriotic principles of those foreigners, Dutch, Swedes, Danes, Russians, or French, who place their money, with whatever view they may have done it, in the British funds? On what principle, then, are the British Creditors in foreign funds thus held up to public scorn, as if they were "jew-like speculators," and enemies to their country? The demands of health and convenience, the cultivation of science and the arts, the relations of trade and commerce, and many other motives, both public and private, carry Englishmen and their families to the Continent, and detain them there; connexions arise in consequence, and will for the lodgment of money, either on public or private security, as suits the expediency or the convenience of the parties, and it is notorious that no small portion of the wealth derived from our possessions in the East has at various times (so difficult is the passage to Europe) passed through the channel of France, and found its way into the funds of that nation first, and ultimately into those of this. As a private creditor in the French funds I have suffered materially from the injustice of the French, joined to the same acquiescence of our own government in not vindicating the cause of the British claimants pending the treaty of Amiens, when they ought to have retained

the French as a pledge for the security of the British property. But it is adding insult to injury to affix injurious epithets to the most innocent transactions, and calumniate the characters of those whose property might at this moment have swelled the British capital, and added to the revenue, had it not been lost to the claimants and to the country, by the pusillanimity of the British ministers. Relying on your wonted impartiality to print this, or to reconsider the subject.—I remain yours, &c. one of your subscribers, and *

A BRITISH CREDITOR.

February 25, 1804.

EARL ST. VINCENT.

SIR,—I have often read with great pleasure your Political Register, and if the following can add weight to the subjects you have already so ably discussed, it is much at your service.—In your Register of the 9th of last July, there was a remark, that Earl St. Vincent did not send a naval force in time to block up Toulon, and prevent the sailing of the French armament under Buonaparté; who very deliberately took Malta, and from thence proceeded, without molestation, to Egypt. To what shall we attribute this error!! Was it to the want of prevoyance in the British admiral? A great commander certainly ought not to be deficient in a quality so essentially requisite in a general. The recapture of Malta, and the conquest of Egypt cost many millions sterling to this country. Let us suppose Malta had not been taken by Buonaparté, nor the French army been landed in Egypt. Is it probable that Buonaparté the determined enemy of this country, would now be First Consul of France? If peace had been made with other rulers, would the present war have existed? To whom are we indebted for all these accumulated evils? Are we to become for ever a military people? All armed and with military ideas of subordination to defend the shores of the united kingdom? This is not ideal, because if reports are well founded (and which is not here meant to be asserted as true) the storehouses of the dock yards will be as empty, and the ships of war in a worse state than they were when Sir Edward Hawke was first Lord of the Admiralty; and at that time, Admiral Sir George Rodney (afterwards Lord Rodney) demanded a

* See remarks on this letter in the Summary of Politics, p. 298.

private audience of his present Majesty, and delivered to the King, the true state of his navy. In consequence, his Majesty dismissed Sir Edward Hawke, and appointed the Earl of Sandwich first Lord of the Admiralty. Strange to relate!!! the navy was in such a ruined condition, that Lord Sandwich (though some years at the head of the Board) had but just completely re-established our marine before the last American war commenced. Thus Sir George Rodney's *timely* interference saved this kingdom from perdition. Let us hope some great man (before it is too late) will ascertain the state of the navy, and render a similar benefit to his King and country.

24 Feb. 1804.

J. O.

PUBLIC PAPERS.

Declaration, given in to the Diet of Ratisbon, by the two Comitial Ministers of the Court of Vienna, on the 30th of January, 1804

The numerous infringements which, since the occupation of the countries assigned as indemnities, have been made by several States of the Empire, in the rights and the immediacy of the Equestrian Order and its members, have for a long time excited the attention of Germany.—His Imperial Majesty, as supreme Chief of the Empire, and agreeably to the obligation under which he lies to maintain the decrees of the Diet, as well as order and tranquillity, has already endeavoured, as is well known, by paternal exhortations, to put a stop to measures contrary to the state of possession, and to the laws which have been pursued in regard to the Equestrian Order and its members, and to re-establish things on their legal footing. These efforts of his Imperial Majesty have not produced that effect which he had a right to expect. The infringements, on the contrary, have become more general and more oppressive, and the consequences in the interior of the empire has been events which must necessarily endanger the public tranquillity, and bring on absolute oppression of the Equestrian Order; the existence and rights of which are, however, equal to those of all the states of the empire, and have been secured, as well as the constitution itself, by the Peace of Westphalia, by the old and new decrees of the diet, and particularly by the last decree of the empire.—At the request of the General Directory of the Equestrian Order in the Aulic Council of the Empire, as a constitutional authority, there was issued, on the 23d of January, by this supreme tribunal, a *conservatorium*, for the protection of the Equestrian Order against all encroach-

ments, which might in future be attempted, and for the re-establishment of that Order in the state in which it was before the occupation of the countries assigned as indemnities. The execution of this sentence is referred to the Elector, the Arch-Chancellor; the Electors of Saxony and Baden, and to his Imperial Majesty himself in his quality of Archduke of Austria, with the clause, each individually, and all collectively,—His Imperial Majesty, in his quality as a state of the Empire, is animated with a sincere desire contributing, according to his strength, to the maintenance of justice in the Empire, as well as of the public safety and tranquillity, and of the security of the German constitution, and he enjoins his ministers to make a declaration on this subject to the General Diet.

Declaration of his Prussian Majesty.

His Majesty, the King of Prussia, has observed with attention and interest the events which have taken place for some time past in several parts of the Empire and in the heart of Germany, in regard to the possessions of the members of the Equestrian Order. It would have been of great advantage if in the recess of the Deputation of the Empire it had been possible to establish a regulation, or fixed rule for ensuring the future relations of the Equestrian Order, in a manner so as to reconcile a regard for the rights of all with the new situation of things, the new wants, and the real good of the Empire.—If the Ecclesiastical States secularised have passed into the hands of new possessors, not only with the rights really exercised, but also with their pretensions; and if these governments formerly ecclesiastical according to their nature and organisation, and according to the interest, merely personal, of their Ecclesiastical Sovereigns, can have seen with indifference the efforts of the Equestrian Order to extend its territorial independence, and its immediacy, the new possessors as sovereign and hereditary laics, may have brought with them new interests, and may have considered things under a different point of view. They must and ought to have found themselves differently obliged to claim rights, which might be considered as real and ancient integral parts of their share of the indemnity—rights which could not be weakened but by negligence and by encroachments made at a former period. Aroused by such an event, the other possessors of the ancient lay countries, where similar relations, equally hurtful to their rights and to their administration, existed, have begun to bring forward their pretensions. Hence it has happened that

most at the same time several of the most distinguished States of the Empire, such as the Elector of Bavaria, the Prince of Fulda, the Elector of Hesse, the Landgrave of Hesse Darmstadt, the Duke of Saxe Meiningen, and other Princes, have all tended to the same object. These Princes have formed claims to the villages and lands of the Equestrian Order lying within their territory, or situated on their frontiers, both because these possessions formerly made an integral part of their countries, and because they are still in relation with the latter by their geographical position, by the feudal law, by the duties and rights of jurisdiction, and other connexions, which as ancient sources, must all be considered as indications of sovereignty. They have consequently thought themselves authorised to replace under their sovereignty these places and lands, and to cause to be announced by patents the possession they have taken of them, and to secure a part of them by sending thither military detachments. Hitherto no uniform and certain principles have been established followed; and not only have contestations arisen among the sovereigns and persons of the Equestrian Order, who have been exposed to encroachments; but differences have broken out between one sovereign and another, in regard to the limits of their respective territorial jurisdictions.—A juridical examination and instruction in regard to this object having been insufficient, because the organization of the empire is not yet completed; the question to know, whether or in what manner the tribunals of the empire ought to interfere in this affair? The whole Germanic Body participates in the regret excited by this state of things, and by the anarchical crisis which threatens, in so great a number of places, the property and subjects of the empire. If every one is convinced that this crisis cannot be of long duration, but that measures ought speedily to be taken to put an end to it is the more indispensably necessary to think of the means of accomplishing this end: the affair has become too important and too general to be discussed by the tribunals of the empire.

(To be continued.)

FOREIGN OFFICIAL PAPER.

Speech of the MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR to the LEGISLATIVE BODY of the French Republic, at the opening of their Session on the 6th of January, 1804.

CITIZENS LEGISLATORS,—But a few months have elapsed since your separation, and you are summoned again to resume the exercise of the august functions which the

constitution has delegated to you.—This sessions of the Legislative Body will be marked by new benefits to the people; the government which has matured in meditation that series of salutary and protecting laws, which establish and consecrate the freedom of persons, the bases of transactions, the guarantee of property, will submit them to your wisdom.—You will not see without admiration, that the government, in the midst of the immense preparations which the war has rendered necessary, has not adjourned a single useful expense, has not suspended a single enterprise begun, has not withdrawn a single idea of amelioration. It has been able by its genius and providence to connect all the benefits of peace with the important cares of war.—We do not see, in any part of the Republic, those agitations which announce apprehensions, or presage reverses; we hear no where those stormy discussions which characterise distrust, or conceal sinister projects; every thing is calm around us—every thing is happy—and every thing is tranquil!—Our courageous youth range themselves with ardour under the standards of the country: the farmer, the merchant, the manufacturer, press round the government to offer it their harvest, their gold, their produce: and the French people, proud of their government, confident in their means, and happy in their institutions, express but one sentiment—love for the August Head of the State.—Free from fear, from agitation, from disquietude, the French people repose in him the care of their destiny.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

ANGLO-GALLIC CREDITORS.—By referring to page 293, the reader will find a letter to the Editor, upon the subject of the claim, set up by certain persons calling themselves "British Creditors in the French funds." This letter appears to have been drawn forth by the remarks, which were made in page 240, which, upon being referred to, will be found to have originated from a printed paper, called "A Statement of Facts," which statement had been sent round to members of Parliament, and other persons whose opinions were likely to have weight in parliamentary proceedings. The object of the paper, especially when thus circulated, was too obvious to be mistaken; and, as this object appeared to be such as ought not to be accomplished, such arguments were used as were thought likely to contribute towards preventing that accomplishment; but, let those who have read the remarks determine, whether the charge of "calum-

niating" the Anglo-Gallic creditors be well or ill founded.—Previous to the short reply, which it is intended to make to the letter in question, it may not be amiss to observe, that, since the accession of the "well-meaning" Doctor and his associates, an entirely new set of ideas, with respect to the liberty of writing and of speaking, appears to have sprung up. Formerly, those who wrote and spoke upon public matters, felt themselves under no other restraint than that which was imposed by truth and decency; but, now, to censure, or to criticise, however truly and decently, is to "calumniate," if it bears hard upon the person or persons, whose conduct, or object, is censured, or criticised; so that, in few words, the doctrine now is, that the greater fool or knave a man is, the greater is the calumny in stating what tends to discover his folly or his knavery.—The Anglo-Gallic creditors were not accused of knavery; they were accused of no "crime;" their "characters" were not attacked; they are, indeed, described as "jew-like speculators," but, that they were speculators they will not deny, and whether the epithet *jew-like* was "injurious" and "calumnious," or not, will be easily determined, when we recollect, that the debts, for which they now claim indemnification, arise, for the far greater part, from the purchase of assignats and other state paper at an average of more than two-thirds below par. Besides, what was the security of the paper so purchased? What was the security, written on the paper itself? Was it the treaty of 1786? Or was it the "National Domains" of France? Was the thing purchased a fair and legitimate object of trade? Was it a thing honestly come by; or was it a sort of stolen goods? In short, did it not consist, principally, of the plundered property of the Church and the Crown, and of that of those persons who remained faithful to them? Well, then, let the speculators go and seek the security, upon which they advanced their money: let them seek the "National Domains;" but, let them not come to the English Parliament, let them not hope to wring from the people of England a compensation for the losses they have, in such a traffic, sustained.—They say, they have been guilty of nothing "contrary to the laws of their country, or to the rights and usages of foreign nations." So much the better for them; but, it is no better for us. We do not complain of them. That is to say, the complaint did not begin with us. We only say, that they are wrong in applying to us for money on this account; and we en-

deavour to show, that we owe them none.—They ask, somewhat exultingly: "Do the Englishmen reprobate the conduct, or patriotic principle, of those foreigners, Dutch, Swedes, Danes, Russians, or French, who place their money in the British funds?" The answer is: some Englishmen certainly do reprobate their conduct, and hold them in the utmost contempt; but, whether this be the case or not, what has it to do with the making of compensation, out of the public purse, to those who have lost their money by such speculations? The question to be asked is, did any government in Europe, or will any government in Europe, compensate its subjects for the money they have lost, or may lose, in the English funds?—We are told, that "the demands of health and convenience, the cultivation of science and the arts, and the relations of trade and commerce, carry Englishmen and their families abroad, in consequence of which connexions arise, and call for the lodgment of money either on public or private security, as suits the convenience of the parties." That is to say, that certain Englishmen, either for their own pleasure or their own profit, deposit their money abroad. How far it is laudable, and ought to be allowed, for people of any country to reside abroad, and draw their incomes after them, may be a question; but, that persons, who, for their own convenience, pleasure, or gain, lodge their wealth abroad, should, when that wealth is lost, have a right to demand compensation from their countrymen, on whom they have turned their backs, from whom they have withheld all share in their enjoyments, is a proposition too preposterous to be for a moment entertained.—The French funds are represented as a channel, through which British property finds its way from India to England. They may be such a channel; but, while it is utterly impossible to conceive what this circumstance has to do with the present question, there can be no difficulty in stating, that, as far as such a channel is necessary, India is an injury to England.—The writer of the letter, on which these remarks are made, complains of scornful language, forgetting, like a true "well-meaning man," that he and his associates have, in their printed paper, stamped the charge of "presumption" upon all those who have dared, or who shall dare, to question the wisdom of the minister, who made the treaty of 1786. Men do not like to be bullied thus. There are persons in the world who doubt of the wisdom of Mr.



Pitt, not only in war and peace, but in finance also, and who inquire, not altogether impertinently, where they shall look for the financial wisdom, which has, in the course of ten years more than doubled the national debt, which has banished gold and silver from the land, and has left the country no other currency than that of a degraded paper. Suppose that a plain honest fellow were, with a ten pound note in his hand, to go up to Mr. Pitt, and say: "wise man, previous to the time that this nation began to enjoy the blessings of thy financial skill, I could buy 44 Spanish milled dollars with this note, which has been lying ever since in my drawer, and now, I find, that I can buy only 40 of those dollars with this same note*." What answer would Mr. Pitt give? Must he not acknowledge, that the bank paper has been degraded in his hands, and by his measures, and must he not also acknowledge, that this degraded paper is almost the only currency of the country? What audacity, then, must those persons have, who stigmatize as "presumptuous" every one that dares to question the wisdom of Mr. Pitt? And this charge comes, too, with such a charming grace from the persons who, in the very same breath, rail against the Treaty of Amiens, a compact which was made by the advice of, and which was publicly defended by, this very Mr. Pitt, this "great statesman," of whose wisdom it is "presumptuous" to doubt! These challenges are very indiscreet, on the part of Mr. Pitt's admirers and friends. Many men, who would never think of publicly criticising his measures, are thus goaded on to it. We overlook much in a person about whom little is said; but to hear him extolled to the skies, and to hear ourselves characterized as foolish and presumptuous, because we venture to express our doubts of his wisdom, and that, too, at the very moment when we not only see, but are smarting under, the effects of his want of wisdom; patiently and in silence to bear this, would argue a shocking want of independence of mind.

REVENUE.—On the 20th ultimo, Mr. Johnstone moved, in the House of Commons, for an account of the nett produce of the taxes, imposed in 1802 and 1803, up to

* A bank note of ten pounds will not fetch even 40 dollars. Stamped dollars were issued at 5s. that is 10 per centum above their sterling value; but they have disappeared. Very few of them ever found their way to the Eastward of Temple Bar. The fact is, a dollar is worth more than 5s. of English bank paper.

the 5th of January, 1804, distinguishing the produce of each year. This is an account very much wanted, seeing that the regular accounts of the year are so long kept back; and, it is with no small satisfaction, that the public will see independent members of Parliament making inquiries of this kind. Mr. Johnstone made some very pertinent remarks as to the disappointment, which the House was likely to experience in the produce of the revenue. The Doctor, in agreeing to the motion, begged the House to observe, that he did not acquiesce in the correctness of the honourable mover's statements. What was meant by this, it would be hard to say, seeing that Mr. Johnstone merely stated the facts as they stood in the Treasury accounts. He said, that, in a comparative view of the produce of the years 1802 and 1803, there was, excluding the amount of new taxes received in the latter, a considerable defalcation in 1803, instead of that "improvement" in the revenue, of which ministers had boasted at the commencement of the session. What need had he of the Doctor's acquiescence with regard to the correctness of this statement? The statement is a simple deduction from the Doctor's own figures, just as simple as that of taking one from two, and saying that there is a remainder of one. Where, then, was the sense of this mysterious reservation? Such tricks have had their effect: to a certain degree they have their effect still, but the day of delusion is nearly at an end. We have been promised, solemnly promised, that this war shall be carried on, "even to a protracted period, without any addition to the national debt," because only 6,000,000l. a year will be borrowed, and those 6,000,000l. will be "paid off" by the sinking fund. It has been clearly shewed, that this is a mere juggle*, and that the 6,000,000l. will constitute a real addition to the debt; but, is there any man, who, after looking at the account of the last year's taxes†, can possibly believe, that a loan of 6,000,000l. a year will be sufficient? The whole expenditure of the year 1804 will amount to about 68,000,000l. and the whole nett income, upon the present taxes, will not surpass 39,000,000l. so that there must be about 29,000,000l. raised, by the means of loans, or of new taxes, unless the Doctor has, as was before hinted, dealings with some supernatural power. There have been 5,000,000l. already borrowed in the

* See Letter to the Doctor, Vol. III. p. 910, et seq.—† See the preceding sheet, p. 289.

shape of Exchequer bills; but, as this sum must make a charge in the supplies of the year, it will not diminish the sum wanted by the minister. To disguise the real state of the revenue, as long as possible, however, it is likely that he may, if he can, keep this 5,000,000l. out of the supplies of the year, and fund, perhaps, the Exchequer bills. Then make a loan of 8, or from 8 to 12 millions, under the pretext of postponed income tax; and, after that, at the close of the session, issue another 5 or 6 millions worth of Exchequer bills. God knows *how* this can be done; but, after what we have seen, is any thing incredible? The minister, in his budget of the 13th of June last, estimated the produce of his war taxes, up to the 5th of January, at 4,500,000l. And, it now appears, from the Treasury account laid before the House of Commons, and printed for the use of the members, that those taxes have produced only 1,874,672l. yet, no one asks a word about the matter! Is such a man fit to be a minister of finance? Can public credit live in the hands of such a minister? Is it because they wish such a minister to be removed, that men are to be accused of disaffection to their country and their sovereign? But, reflections of this sort are of little avail. Events are coming on; events amidst which cant and juggle will be a subject of mockery instead of a source of delusion.—As the financial difficulties are now pressing upon the Doctor, it would not be fair to dismiss this topic, without observing, that these difficulties could, in pursuing the same system, have been avoided by no other man. Mr. Pitt would have supported them better; he would have given to the Treasury statements a more flattering appearance; he would have exhibited a prettier show; he would, from vulgar eyes, at least, have concealed the delusive machinery. But, Mr. Pitt could not have met the present expenditure, without having recourse to loans, or without some bold encroachment on the property of the country: loans would have brought us whither the Doctor is now speedily driving, and such an encroachment on property as is here alluded to, would have produced a still more violent effect. Mr. Pitt would have eked out our journey; he would have conducted us more pleasantly; but, it is far from being certain, that he would not, at last, have given us a more rude and fatal fall. The monied people hate the Doctor; they think him the cause of all the misfortunes that they feel, and the calamities that they dread: but, the Doctor, poor man, has, in measures of finance, only imitated, strictly imitated,

his predecessor; and, indeed, the only great measure of finance that has been adopted since his *accession* was not only supported, but was dictated to him, by Mr. Pitt. Nevertheless, in spite of these facts, and every other that you can adduce, the money-mongers and mercantile men, generally speaking, say, and really believe, that there only wants Mr. Pitt in power, to restore public credit to its full vigour; and, when you shew them, as clear as day-light, the folly of such an expectation, they reply to you, that he is the first orator in the world. Suppose this to be true, orators are not conjurers, and it requires nothing short of conjuration to make a bank note of ten pounds worth four dollars more than it is now worth. True, he can talk, both loud and long he can talk; but, unless he can talk the seals off the jew's bonds, and thereby nullify their present demands upon our property and our labour, his talking, as Lord Redesdale says of the Roman Catholic creed, is "given to the winds."

IRISH EXCHANGE.—Some excellent remarks upon this subject will be found in the preceding pages of this sheet. It is there observed, that, the Irish Lords of the Treasury and others receive their salaries, without any diminution; but, in fact, they receive them with an addition; for, when those salaries were fixed, it was supposed, that they were liable to all the fluctuation of the course of exchange; and, these officers, it must be well known, would not give the country credit for any advantage that might have arisen, or may yet arise, from an exchange favourable to Ireland and to them. This is a matter that demands immediate and strict examination; for, it really appears, that the officers of the Irish government are deeply interested in the continuation of the high exchange. Besides, is this the way to reconcile the Irish to the Union? Is it the way to restore peace and harmony to that distracted country? Is it the way to preserve England from the fatal blow, which she is in danger of receiving through the side of Ireland? Those who care nothing about Ireland, may, one would think, care enough for themselves to induce them to promote an inquiry so necessary to the safety of England.

IRISH CATHOLICS.—The horror excited in the public mind, by the perusal of the shocking relation published in the preceding sheet, is a favourable symptom of what will take place, in consequence of the conduct of the Irish ministry, in, and subsequent to, the affair of the 23d of July. The nation will be greatly indebted to Sir John Wrot-

policy for bringing that subject before Parliament; and, it is to be hoped, that the famous letters of the Lord Chancellor of unfortunate Ireland will not be forgotten. The ministry themselves have now revived and agitated the Catholic Question. Nobody uttered a syllable respecting it, notwithstanding the numerous provocations that were given. Lord Redesdale has begun; he has declared the fixed opinion of himself and his colleagues; he has raised an insurmountable bar against reconciliation in Ireland, while the present ministry are in power, and particularly while he occupies his place, where, according to the minister's own words, he directs *all* the steps of the Lord Lieutenant. His letters have been published; the Irish nation must know, that these letters are known to their Sovereign and his ministers, and to the Parliament; and, if nothing is done, or said, by either of the branches of the government, what will be, what *must* be, the conclusion drawn by the Irish Catholics? And, of this conclusion, joined to other causes, what must be the consequence at no very distant period? Every man, therefore, who has remaining in his bosom the least regard for his King and country, must be anxious to see some inquiry take place with respect to the very extraordinary conduct alluded to; something or other, to convince the Catholics of Ireland, that is to say, three-fourths of the population of that country, that Lord Redesdale has *not* expressed the sentiments of their gracious Sovereign and of the Parliament, and that they are not doomed to be regarded, be their professions and their conduct what they may, as lying continually in wait to commit acts of murder and rebellion. What ought to be done, it would, perhaps, be presumptuous to point out; but, it should be recollected, that, if the reports, which the ministers are continually propagating, relative to the prospect of invasion, are well founded, there is no time to be lost; for, considering the resentment and animosity, which the letters of the Lord Chancellor cannot fail to have excited in the breasts of so large a proportion of the people, who can contemplate, without trembling, the consequences of an invasion of Ireland by a Roman Catholic army? As long as those letters remain unnoticed by the Parliament and by his Majesty; as long as the Irish Roman Catholics are left to conclude, that the Lord Chancellor has spoken the sentiments of the *whole* government, legislative as well as executive, so long they must regard themselves as out-casts, as a sect politically excommunicated; as a people in

whom we Protestants have no confidence, whose professions and whose oaths are "given to the winds;" of whom we are resolved to live in constant *distrust*! And, is it possible; can it be, that the Parliament will, by their silence, become parties to this dreadful denunciation against four millions of their fellow subjects, at a time when every heart and hand is wanted to resist the attacks of our enemy, which attacks, be it remembered, the Irish Catholics will, in all likelihood, be the first persons called upon to resist!

VOLUNTEER SYSTEM.—The bill for consolidating the Volunteer laws was read a second time, in the House of Commons, on the 27th ultimo, and the House went into a committee upon it on the 29th. On these occasions there were very long debates, without bringing forth any thing very new, except some projects, on the part of Mr. Pitt; upon which projects it will be necessary here to make some remarks.—It will be remembered, that, as was before stated, the bill proposed by the ministers contained just nothing at all, except an explanation of the Attorney-General's opinion, or rather, a contradiction of that opinion, which contradiction was useless, seeing that the opinion had been rendered of no effect by the decision of the Court of King's Bench, where the judges did not think it necessary to listen to any arguments, in reply to those advanced by the *learned* gentlemen in defence of his opinion.—The bill was a mere skeleton, a mere piece of blank paper, thrown before the House for Volunteer Statesmen to fill up. The Opposition very wisely declined to enter into this service; but, Mr. Pitt, "though he thought, that the matter would more properly have originated with his Majesty's ministers, yet, his *deep sense of duty* would not suffer him to neglect the propositions which appeared to him eligible." Thus actuated, he proceeded, on the 27th, to describe the nature and extent of the regulations, which it was his intention to introduce. "To these propositions," said he, "I shall strictly confine myself, and abstaining from all allusion to whatever I may think on the present state of politics, or to the conduct of ministers hitherto, I shall apply myself solely to the examination of our national defence—that appears to me to be the first and most interesting subject. It ought to occupy the attention of every man. It is quite enough to fill the mind of any man (a cry of hear! hear!). This, therefore, claiming my consideration, in preference to every other subject, I look with

“ great concern to the *imperfections of the*
 “ *volunteer system*, recollecting that it is
 “ pushed to an extent far beyond any thing
 “ that was foreseen when the country was
 “ first declared in danger; and, considering
 “ its present magnitude, I regret to find
 “ that it is not more advanced in military
 “ quality, and that it is still extremely in-
 “ adequate to its object—that the proper
 “ means of promoting its discipline have
 “ not been as yet adopted. These means,
 “ which I deem most material, I conceive
 “ to be, first, the opportunity of regular in-
 “ structions; secondly, the securing at-
 “ tendance at drill; and thirdly, the *en-*
 “ *forcing silence, steadiness, &c.* when at
 “ drill. On the first of these points, I beg
 “ to ask of any thinking man, whether it is
 “ possible for the volunteers to acquire a
 “ sufficient knowledge of the simplest part
 “ of military discipline, by attending drill
 “ only twenty days in a year, and generally
 “ not more than two or three hours each
 “ day—particularly taking into account the
 “ inadequacy of the instructions, &c. I am
 “ aware that these arguments may be said
 “ to offer objections to the system altoge-
 “ ther; but these objections I feel to be re-
 “ moveable by attending to the alterations
 “ I have suggested, and shall hereafter pro-
 “ pose. What may be done at a future
 “ time, I shall not now enter into, but
 “ merely confine myself to the manner in
 “ which they should make the best use of
 “ the time that yet remains to prepare them
 “ for the impending danger; and this pre-
 “ paration should be stimulated and en-
 “ couraged by the conduct of Parliament.
 “ The spirit of *our gallant volunteers*, so
 “ long tried by suspense, may be otherwise
 “ relaxed. Danger being so often menaced
 “ and so long suspended, their zeal may be
 “ weakened, unless the Parliament shall do
 “ its duty by giving to those *valiant patriots*
 “ every possible means of rendering their
 “ exertions in the cause of their country
 “ completely effectual. This done, and
 “ your views fully explained, I am fully
 “ persuaded that the volunteers will accede
 “ to any proposal that the necessity of the
 “ case may suggest. Such is the nature of
 “ the minds of Englishmen, that I have not
 “ the shadow of doubt that there is no dif-
 “ ficulty which they would not encounter,
 “ and no privation to which they would
 “ not submit, when they should understand
 “ that such difficulties and privation were
 “ necessary to succeed in the *glorious cause*
 “ committed to their charge, of rescuing
 “ their country from danger, and establish-
 “ ing the security of their countrymen. In

“ order then to promote the efficiency which
 “ I have in view, I would propose that the
 “ volunteer corps should be encouraged to
 “ go on *permanent duty*, suppose for a week,
 “ or two or three, as was the case last sum-
 “ mer in particular districts on the coast,
 “ always taking care to assemble the corps
 “ in the place convenient to their native
 “ home. For this purpose, I should pro-
 “ pose that a *small bounty* should be given
 “ to each volunteer who would consent to
 “ march on such permanent duty, *namely,*
 “ *7s. per week*, independently of *1s. per day*,
 “ to every volunteer who should so march.
 “ This plan would, I am persuaded, do
 “ more towards promoting discipline and
 “ military habits among the men, than any
 “ drilling at different and detached periods.
 “ I had an opportunity of witnessing the
 “ salutary effects of such a system last sum-
 “ mer. About 2 or 300,000 l. would be
 “ quite sufficient to defray the expense of
 “ it. Surely it cannot be pretended that
 “ Parliament manage with judgment and
 “ integrity the purse of their constituents,
 “ if they refuse to open it in order to ad-
 “ vance this sum for a purpose of such
 “ high importance, to save the lives and
 “ property of the people, and to bring the
 “ contest in which we are engaged to a
 “ *speedy and glorious conclusion*. Now, as
 “ to the mode of instructing the volunteer
 “ corps, I mentioned before Christmas very
 “ fully the propriety of appointing field of-
 “ ficers, &c. &c. to such battalions as ap-
 “ plied for them, and I am still of the same
 “ opinion. As none of the arguments
 “ which have been advanced against my re-
 “ commendation appear to me to have any
 “ weight, and as I know, from my own ob-
 “ servation, the advantages that would re-
 “ sult from it, I would propose that the
 “ instruction of volunteer corps should be
 “ assisted by the regular officers stationed in
 “ the several districts, particularly those on
 “ the coast, on some parts of which not less
 “ than from 80 to 100,000 men might be
 “ very speedily collected. I would also
 “ recommend the adoption of some system,
 “ not harsh, to enforce *attendance at drill*,
 “ which is particularly necessary. This
 “ might be done by regulations, to which
 “ each man might *subscribe*—imposing fines
 “ on defaulters, rendering the inattention at
 “ parades liable to *arrest and detention*, until
 “ tried *before a magistrate*, who should have
 “ the power of commuting any fine for a
 “ *short imprisonment* of 2 or 3 days. I agree
 “ with the right honourable mover, that no
 “ change should be made in the volunteer
 “ regulations that is not called for by abso-

lute necessity, and of such a nature do I conceive the proposition I have submitted; so I believe almost every man who has *witnessed their parades* must confess; and when the cause and object of this change should be explained to the volunteers themselves, I am satisfied *none* of them would be found to *murmur*, much less to resign, particularly when such communication should be accompanied by the intimation contained in this bill, that they might resign if they did not think proper to remain on such conditions.

"As to the right of volunteers to recommend their officers, about which so much has been said, it strikes me that there is no material difference upon that point, if gentlemen would endeavour truly to understand it. While a controul was acknowledged to exist in the commanding officer of each corps, in the lord lieutenants of counties, and finally, in ministers, the claim was frivolous to insist on; and yet it would be dangerous to concede it, even in appearance. I have at the same time a wish and a hope that a commanding officer will upon occasion of any vacancy judiciously *consult the sentiments of the corps*, but not in any thing like the forms of a popular election, to take their individual suffrages.—Here the right honourable gentlemen entered into a very comprehensive review of the progress of the regular army and militia since the commencement of the war, and contended that neither the recruiting of the one nor the balloting of the other was so much impeded by the increase of the volunteers as some gentlemen seemed anxious to impress on the minds of the House, while he thought, on the contrary, that the volunteer system would, by proper modifications, tend to the regular maintenance and progressive augmentation of our public force. The complained of slowness in the ballot for the Army of Reserve and Militia might be easily accounted for, from the circumstance of the great number to be ballotted for in the first year of the war; and this, independently of the volunteer system, was sufficient to produce a considerable difficulty in recruiting for the regular army. To provide a resource to recruit the regular army, he would propose that a system somewhat modelled on the principle of the Army of Reserve, should be *kept up*, and that from that body any that should volunteer for general service should be supplied by *fresh ballot*. One reason for this plan was, that the army

should not altogether depend on the contingency of an ordinary recruiting; and another, that the militia should be held sacred, and that no volunteers for general service should be sought for from that body in future. The proportion between this Army of Reserve and the Militia to be fixed, and that the militia should be *gradually reduced* from its present establishment to its *old standard*, and that according as vacancies occur in that body a ballot should take place for an equal number, not to fill up such vacancies, but to go to the Army of Reserve. Thus, as the one body were reduced, the other would be augmented, and the change having a gradual operation, would not be likely to produce confusion in any branch of our public force. He was aware, however, that this proposed change would incur some unpopularity, and some pressure on the parishes; but to this he would say, that such pressures ought to be softened, if they could not be remedied, and if they could not be remedied they ought to be endured. To this he had no doubt the people would submit *cheerfully* when they reflected on the *value of the object for which they had to contend*, and that nothing could diminish their *devout gratitude to Providence upon a comparison of their situation with those countries which neglecting timely precaution, and refusing perhaps to suffer small losses in the first instance, committed themselves to the will of that power which now employed all its resources to assail this country*. The right honourable gentleman particularly urged the introduction of a plan to *limit the bounties to be given to substitutes*, that it should be always less than that to recruits for the regular army—the bounties to which also should be limited, in order to put a stop to the proceedings of those pests to society called crimps. He thought it would be wise to allot a certain number of regiments to be recruited in certain counties, according to the amount of the population of such counties; and that the recruiting officers should be stationary in such counties. Thus he conceived the recruits would be more easily obtained, through the connexion that would grow up between the people, the recruiting officers, and the regiments to which they might belong; and the consequence of the system would produce an *esprit du corps* that would be highly advantageous. The right honourable gentleman took notice of the propriety of attending somewhat more to the system of fortifications,

"and also improving our naval defence, which he stated from his own knowledge to be very defective. While our danger was greater, and our resources also, than at any former period, he complained that our state of naval preparation was much lower. He declared, that in this statement he was not influenced by the slightest prejudice against any man. On the contrary, in the whole of his observations he wished to keep aloof from every description of asperity, which he thought ought not upon any account to be introduced in the course of this discussion. This was not a time for the operation of any party spirit."

As to party spirit; whether there was any shown, in this debate, by any body else, whether this observation was at all called for from Mr. Pitt, and whether *his* speech was intended to answer party views, are questions, upon which I shall, probably, touch hereafter; at present, I shall confine myself to the improvements, which the right hon. gent. proposes to make in the volunteer system, taking them in the order, in which they lie before me.—FIRST; he proposes, that, with a view of rendering the volunteers adequate to the object of their institution, they should be encouraged to go, as soon as possible, on permanent duty, for the space of two or three weeks, always taking care to quarter each corps in the place most convenient to their native home; and, in order to induce them to go upon this permanent duty, he would give to each of them a "small bounty," namely, seven shillings a week, independently of the one shilling a day. What bounty he would give to the officers and non-commissioned officers he does not say; but, he insists, that about 2 or 300,000*l.* would be sufficient to defray the whole expense; so that, it is evident, that he means to draw only a *part* of the volunteers out on permanent duty, for, if he were to draw out the 400,000 they would, according to his plan, swallow up 280,000*l.* in *one week*, allowing not a farthing for officers, non-commissioned officers, barracks, baggage, or contingent expenses of any kind; and, the truth is, that the 300,000*l.* would not defray the expenses of 250,000 men for more than a week, because there must be an allowance for the officers and non-commissioned officers; there must be baggage and barrack expenses; and there must be contingent charges to no small amount. But, what could be done in the way of discipline, in the space of *one week*? There is no doubt but the days of this week would begin with the first day of preparation for

marching, and that care would be taken to return home before the last day of it was expired. Allow, then, that the corps would, upon an average, have ten miles to march, they would have four days, exclusive of Sunday, to exercise, or do what is called duty in, and, for these four days each man would receive 14 shillings! Care would be taken, undoubtedly, to bespeak sun-shine weather, otherwise the money might be all thrown away. It is clear, however, that the gentleman could not have so short a space of time in view: three weeks, at least, it is fair to presume, he intended to describe as a space for "permanent duty;" and, in that case, his 300,000*l.* might suffice for 130,000 men; but, let me ask any man, whether he understands any thing of military matters or not, if he would not rather, and much rather too, see this sum of 300,000*l.* expended in the maintenance of 12 good battalions of regular infantry, well clothed, armed, accoutred, and commanded? for, such a force could be maintained for a *whole year* upon the money, which Mr. Pitt proposes to expend upon 130,000 volunteers, in the course of three weeks! When the volunteers are thus called out upon "permanent duty" there must take place a sort of drafting or *volunteering* in each corps; for, it seems, none are so to march but such as choose; and, when they return to the corps again, they are, I suppose, like the select vessels among the Methodists, to communicate their experiences to the brethren! Whether these experiences are to be received under the operation of martial law, or otherwise, the gentleman did not state; but, if they are, I should be glad to know, who will execute that law; and, if they are not, I am still more anxious to know what means will be provided for the protection of persons and property, in and near the places where these "small bounty" men will be quartered. And, who is to command the volunteering volunteers? Suppose only a third part of a corps turns out as "small bounty" men, is the commanding officer of the corps to turn out with them? And, if so, who is to command the men who remain in the parish? Who shall say, too, that a due portion of officers and non-commissioned officers will be ready to march? And, if not, how is the deficiency to be supplied? If the officers, who, in general, are merchants, tradesmen, and farmers, cannot remain from home three weeks at a time, are they to be cashiered, and is their place to be supplied by journeymen and labourers? And, lastly, when the "small bounty" men come home from their expedition, is it like-

that they will live in very great harmony with that part of the corps who have not left home? In short, who, upon barely hearing these questions asked, has not already answered, that the plan is utterly impracticable; and, that the only good that could possibly arise from attempting its execution, would be to throw all the corps in the kingdom into ten times greater confusion than they already are, and shew us, at once, the incurable defects of the system? The effect on the regular army must be dreadful. The "small bounty" men, would, doubtless, be quartered, during their "permanent duty," where they would be liable to be frequently seen by the soldiers of the army. Indeed, the gentleman proposes to bring 80 or 100,000 of them so near to the regulars, that the former may be assisted in their instruction by the regular officers in the several districts respectively. And, does Mr. Pitt think, that the "small-bounty" men, who, in addition to a soldier's pay, will receive wherewith to get dead drunk three days in a week, and who will have little or no control over them, does he think, that such men, dressed in soldier's clothes and calling themselves soldiers, does he really think that such men will afford an useful example to the regular army? And does he hope, that the non-commissioned officers, or even the officers, of that army will entirely escape the contagion, especially when by another part of his plan, captains and subalterns of the army are invited to seek for promotion to the rank of field-officers by *paying their court*, not to their superiors in the army, but to the officers and men of volunteer corps? — SECONDLY; Mr. Pitt recommends, in order to enforce attendance at drill, that, in each corps, a set of regulations shall be subscribed by each member, and that these regulations should impose fines upon defaulters, and should render persons not attending at parade liable to arrest and detention, until tried before a magistrate, who should have the power of commencing any fine for a short imprisonment of two or three days!!! Upon this part of his scheme Mr. Pitt observed, that he was decidedly against making any change in the system, unless such as was of absolute necessity, and that this was so, he said, would be denied by no man who had witnessed the volunteer parades. Whether the change were proposed be of absolute necessity, or not, I shall not attempt to decide; but this I do know, that it never can be carried into execution. If adopted in the act, it will, of course, be general. The regulations will be the same in every corps, or else, Par-

liament may as well hold its tongue upon the subject, and leave the corps and their committees to go on with the good work of legislation, which, thanks to Mr. Pitt and the ministers, they have already so diligently and successfully begun. If the regulations are not prescribed by the act, the act must empower the magistrates to carry the regulations of each corps, be they what they may, into effect. But, let who will make the regulations, no man, it seems, is to be bound by them, unless he chooses to subscribe to them. And, how many men are there in this United Kingdom, who will voluntarily set their hands to a paper, which shall compel them to appear at a certain place, to obey certain persons, and perform certain acts, upon pain of instant arrest and imprisonment? Are there one hundred men, out of three millions, who will do this? Besides, did ever mortal man before hear of such a jumble of civil and military authority? Who is to be the judge of the offence? Is the offender to be arrested by a warrant or an order? Is he to be seized by a serjeant or a constable? Where is he to be detained? In the jail, or in a guard-house? If the latter, suppose he attempts to escape? Can the persons who have charge of him shoot him? Is there any crime in rescuing him? What an endless source of broils, ill-blood, of assaults, batteries and law-suits! What "glorious confusion" would reign from one end to the other of the country! These projects are to be received with great caution. Nothing is so dangerous, especially in times like the present, as that spirit of innovation, that defiance of all usage and all experience, that eagerness to meet every emergency with some *new* invention, which, I am truly sorry to say it, appears, of late, constantly to pervade the mind of Mr. Pitt. Has this gentleman heard of no volunteer being imprisoned? Has he heard of any one being imprisoned and not rescued by his comrades? Does he think, that any round-house or jail would long contain a volunteer confined for military misbehaviour? Does he in good truth imagine, that a young man, or that any man not of base spirit or infamous character, would submit to be lodged in the receptacle for thieves and other ignominious offenders, merely because he had been absent from a parade without leave, or without sufficient cause? Does he, indeed, suppose, that a father will, on such an account, quietly walk into jail in the presence of his children? Or, that any man will, for such a cause, submit to such disgrace in the eyes of his relations, his friends, or his neighbours? And, if it be not an imprisonment in

a jail or some place other than military, what has the civil magistrate to do with the commitment? If such a regulation were to pass into a law, one of two consequences would result from it; either no volunteers would subscribe the regulation, and then it would be nugatory, or, if generally signed, and attempted to be enforced, it would produce continual riots and rescues, till, in a very short space of time, the magistracy and the laws would be trodden under foot. If, therefore, the volunteers cannot be induced to attend without such a regulation as this; if this be a measure of "absolute necessity" to the existence of the volunteer system, that system never can be supported for another half year, without shaking to its centre the civil government of the country. "Man," he has very truly and very tritely observed, "is the creature of habit;" and, let him remember, that, if he once destroys or considerably enfeebles the habitual reverence for, and obedience to, the laws, he will, in reality, have gone very far towards subverting the constitution, to uphold which must certainly be one of his principal objects.— Having thus provided, as he seemed to think, for the permanence and discipline of the volunteers, Mr. Pitt next directed his fostering care towards the regular army, in which, though directly in the teeth of his former calculations, opinions, and predictions, he was obliged to confess recruiting was at a stand. Still clinging, however, to his volunteer system, though found to be so miserably defective, he would not allow, that it had contributed towards the impoverishing of the army, notwithstanding the contrary had been proved, by argument, fifty times over, and notwithstanding that argument nor any part of it had ever been attempted to be refuted. But, in spite of all his endeavours to preserve his consistency, without acknowledging his error, he does allow, that, such is the state of the country, from some cause or other, that the army cannot any longer be kept up (not augmented, but kept up) by the ordinary means of recruiting, even including all the aid, which it has received, and which it is likely to receive, from the indentments made amongst the creatures, who have, merely for the sake of money, become substitutes in the army of reserve. To prevent the army, therefore, from wasting entirely away, and yet not to give up any part of the volunteer corps, Mr. Pitt proposes, that the militia should be reduced! His project is this: that there shall be in constant existence a body called the Army of Reserve; that, from this body, men may at any time enlist into the regulars, and, as fast as they do so

enlist, their places shall be supplied by a fresh ballot; that, as vacancies occur in the militia, they should remain not filled up, until that body be reduced to its "old standard;" that, in consequence of every such vacancy, a man should be balloted for, but that, instead of joining the militia, he should join the army of reserve, in order to keep up the means of recruiting from this latter body into the regular army; "and thus," says he, "as one body would be reduced, the other would be augmented." Very true, just as one bottle is filled by the emptying of another into it; but, most people will allow, that the liquor, at every remove, becomes more flat and worthless, and certain I am, that there is no military officer, who would not rather have one man, originally raised for the regular army, than three men, who, through the hands of parish officers or dealers in substitutes, have first reached the army of reserve, and have then, for the sake of a new bounty, and not for the love of the service, come into the regular army.— But, before I proceed any further, I cannot refrain from referring, for a moment, to the parliamentary debates in June last, upon the subject of the army of reserve. On the first agitating of that subject, Mr. Windham made the speech, from which my motto is taken, and every word of which should now be carefully attended to. Mr. Pitt did not that day, speak at any length; but, he took care to say, that he "completely differed" from almost the whole of Mr. Windham's "ideas." In the debate of the 23d of June, Mr. Elliot, who spoke before Mr. Pitt, expressed his opinion, that unless the militia were reduced to the "old standard" the regular army must remain in a state of impoverishment; and, during his speech, by a word from Mr. Windham, it appeared that this was the opinion of both of them. It is best to quote the passage in the report of the debate. "I am a friend to the principle of the militia, and am afraid, there is a shade of difference of opinion, upon this point, between me and my right hon. friend; [Mr. Windham indicated that there was none]—I am glad that I do not differ from my right hon. friend. But, though I am a friend to the general principle of the militia, I certainly never would have consented to increase it beyond its original number." In the debate of the 1st of May, 1802, Mr. Windham said, that the militia ought to be kept at, if not below, its "old establishment."—In answer to Mr. Elliot, during the debate of the 23d

* See Register, Vol. III. p. 1832. 251327 to 7

Mr. Pitt, after some sarcastic remarks on the opinions of Mr. Elliot and Mr. Windham, which remarks appeared to give no slight to the militia colonels; after calling the virtues of that "constitutional force" the militia, and reverting to the glories of the militia when it was first established, said, that he was not a little surprised when he heard Mr. Pitt gravely asserted, that the existence of a large militia force was incompatible with the existence of a large regular army; that being admitted, that a Militia of 30,000 was good in its kind, it must be allowed, that, under the present circumstances, we wanted a much larger number." And, this person, who now proposes to reduce the militia to this very number of 30,000—Ought we not, another time, to hesitate, before we are led into measures at the suggestion of this gentleman? The gradual extinction of the militia, leaving the army and reserve out of the question, is a wise proposition; but, it is well known, and Mr. Pitt has not publicly to have acknowledged, that it is a proposition, which was long ago made by Mr. Windham.—However, the great and intuitive mind of Mr. Pitt, over which there hangs such a thick cloud on the 3rd of June last, has now discovered, not that a large militia force is incompatible with a large regular army, but that it is incompatible with a small regular army; and, therefore, he wishes to reduce it; but here the good of his project is over-balanced by the evil. This reduction is not to afford relief to the parishes; it is not to tend to open the field for recruiting by diminishing the call for, and, of course, the number of, substitutes; the same number of men are still to be balloted for, the burden on the persons not entitled to volunteer exemptions is to be increased, and the difficulties of recruiting in the regular, and the proper way must now be regarded, if this project be adopted, as being completely cut off for the whole duration of the war. What an enormous expense will this preposterous project, if it become a law, entail on the nation? What an intolerable burden upon the persons exposed to the ballot? And, of what sort of men will the regular army, thus recruited, consist? What does Mr. Pitt think can be done with the miserable water-like stuff that will be poured into the regular army through the army of reserve, into which they have been led purely by hankering after those heastly enjoyments, which are to be procured only by money. And, it be remembered, too, that, it will be the worst, and not the best part, of the army of reserve, that will enter into the re-

gulars; the men who are disliked by their officers; men who are in debt, or have rendered themselves suspected by their comrades, or who cannot resist the temptation of enjoying another week or two of delicious drunkenness. And this is the description of persons who are to fight the battles, to defend the liberties, and to avenge the injuries of England! But, says Mr. Pitt, what will prevent the creditable youth of the country from entering into the army of reserve; or into the regular army, if they like it better? let him look at the army of reserve, and see if the creditable youth of the country have entered it. No; the high bounties have degraded the profession of a soldier, which, God knows, was never much respected in this shop keeping country. It is now no longer a profession; it is a mere trade; it is talked of as a trade; and, accordingly, it offers no allurements but the bare money; parodying what Swift says of the law, "it is now so much blood for so much money, and so much money for so much blood." The consequences are what we see, and they are just such as it was natural to expect, from committing the formation and supporting of an army to the hands of tax-grinders and stock calculators.—As to the project for "limiting the bounty to be given to substitutes," and for preventing its being so high as the bounty for the regular army, it strikes one as something so much like Robespierre's *maximum*, that to attempt to reason upon it would be perfectly useless. This, however, may be said, without hearing the project in detail, that the bounty for the regular army must be higher than the average of the army of reserve bounty now is, or, the persons balloted must be compelled to serve in person. Which of these provisions Mr. Pitt may choose is not, perhaps, very certain; but, without one or the other of them, the project must fall to the ground.—The confining of recruiting parties to particular districts would have no good effect; and the making of recruiting officers stationary in these districts would produce great injury to the recruiting service. Novelty, which is pleasant in every thing else, is not less so in matters of this kind; and, before Mr. Pitt again states, that "recruits would be more easily obtained, through the connexion that would grow up between the people and the recruiting officers," let him consult the returns that have been made, upon the recruiting service, and see whether such a connexion has not invariably proved an obstacle in the way of success. In short, his notions upon this subject are completely

at variance with all the maxims of the army, maxims which have grown, not out of a spirit for projecting, but out of long observation and experience. Before I dismiss this subject entirely, I cannot forbear to say a word or two upon the manner in which Mr. Pitt introduced what he had to say, in both debates, upon the subject of the volunteer system, and matters connected therewith. He acknowledges the many and great defects of the system; but, he will not hear a word of doing it away. "No," says he, "it is *now* too late to talk of that; there is *not* time to supply the place of the volunteer system; we must rely upon that, or upon *nothing*, and, therefore, all that remains for us to do, is to determine how we can best improve it, it being now *extremely inadequate to its object*." This want of time is, with Mr. Pitt, a standing argument for the adoption of any thing that he proposes, relative to the defence of the country. The army of reserve might not, he said, be the best measure that could be devised; but, there was no time to think of any other; the Volunteer system, as it *now* stands, was not so good as it might have been; but there was no time to make it better: the danger pressed, the enemy was at hand; and, as he sarcastically told Mr. Elliot, on the 23d of June, "unless he could obtain a cartel from Buonaparté to stop till we had raised a regular army, his objection to the balloted force would be of no avail." This is just his language now. He tells us that the enemy may come in a week, or a fortnight; and that, therefore, there is no time to think about obtaining another sort of force in the place of the volunteers. Thus we are always in a hurry; always acting upon the spur of the moment; always adopting measures under the impression of immediate danger. Upon this same principle Mr. Pitt deprecated all inquiry into the past conduct of ministers relative to the defence of the country. We are not to ask even in which way our means have hitherto been employed. We are not to inquire what the ministers have done with the millions that they have taken from us for our defence: no, we are to carry them more, and ask no questions. "The defence of the country ought to occupy every man's attention: it is quite enough to fill the mind of any man, without mixing with it any inquiries as to the state of politics, or the conduct of ministers." Oh! exclaim the trembling Cockneys, what patrio-

tic sentiments! What a disinterested man he is! he scorns all party spirit, and thinks about nothing but saving us from the hands of those hard-hearted ruffians, who have vowed our destruction! Nothing, it may be confessed, is better calculated to take with the great and little vulgar, than the line of conduct pursued by Mr. Pitt; by persons who are not to be caught with the may be permitted to ask, whether he did not, so long as five months ago, give, at a toast amongst his Cockney friends, "the Volunteers, and a speedy meeting with Buonaparté upon our own shores!" Meaning, thereby, that he wished the enemy might land, and that he might be encountered, five months ago, by the very troops which he declares to be *now* "extremely inadequate to their object!" And, might, too, be permitted to ask Mr. Pitt whether, amongst the means of rational defence, a wise and vigorous ministry ought not to be reckoned, as essential; and, if one might further ask him, what object he can have in view by using all his influence for the purpose of prolonging the duration *without strengthening the hands*, of the present ministry, whom both he and his friends have represented, and are continually representing, as incapable of conducting the affairs of the nation at any time whatever. Let us have an answer to these questions before we hear any more of the patriotic conduct of Mr. Pitt. Either the ministry ought to have his support, or they ought not. In the first, why does he not support them? Why does he not give them *real* support, and not preface every speech, in which he defends them, with hints that this is "the proper time for inquiring into their conduct?" If the second, why does he not openly and manfully oppose them? On line or the other it *must* be his duty to take *Decidedly* one or the other. Any thing between; any thing that shall prop up, without supporting; that shall hold in check without opposing, must be injurious to the country, and must, by every man of sense and spirit, be regarded, not only as unjust, otic and undignified, but selfish and mean in the extreme.

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